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TheUnited Nations was born in the aftermath of theSecond World War with the aim of curtailing use offorce and promoting common goals. It is now
strongly arguable that force cannot be used by a state
except in the following circumstances:
• Self defence and assisting a state where an armed attack
has taken place;
• Neutralising the threat posed by an imminent armed
attack;
• Responding to a gross violation of human rights – such
a genocide;
• Pursuant to authorisation by the Security Council (in
accordance with Arts 39 and 42 of the UN Charter).
However, the ability of just one permanent member to
enfeeble the Security Council (SC) by casting a negative
vote was a dominant feature of Cold War politics. This is,
and always has been, an intrinsic part of the UN system (as
per Art 27 of the UN Charter). It reflects the fact that the
SC is a political body. Indeed, it is worth remembering that
the SC has rarely acted with unanimity.
Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
permanent members of the SC were anxious to show the
international community that they could be united. The
concept of the “new world order” was being heralded as an
era in which maintenance of world peace and security was
at the core. This provided the context within which the SC
considered the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.
IRAQ SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
In resolution 678 of 1990, the SC authorised member
states to use “all necessary means” to uphold and
implement its resolutions condemning the invasion, and to
restore international peace and security in the area.
The SC imposed detailed obligations on Iraq in resolution
687 of 1991 as a necessary step for achievement of its
stated objective of restoring international peace and
security in the area. Both of these resolutions were passed
unanimously under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That
meant that the resolutions were binding on all member
states of the UN (Article 25 of the UN Charter).
We need to remember that Security Council Resolutions
(“SCR’s”) cannot be interpreted like English legislation or
a Treaty. The context of SCR’s and their long term aims are
of fundamental significance. The resolutions identified
above demanded that Saddam Hussein’s regime must
comply with its obligations under international law. These
included very clearly defined disarmament obligations. It is
wrong to say they were limited to matters concerning
Kuwait. The Security Council was manifestly taking a long
term view, and that is why it imposed obligations to
neutralise the future threat that Saddam Hussein’s regime
could pose to other states in the region, and consequently
to international peace and security.
It is also clear that the Security Council has never
declared that Saddam Hussein’s regime no longer poses a
threat to international peace and security – on the
contrary. It has also never formally revoked the
authorisation for states to “use all necessary means” to
respond to the threat posed. The fact that Resolution 678
was never formally revoked is because of the persistent
non-compliance by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the
threat to international peace and security this continues to
pose.
RESOLUTION 1441
SC Resolution 1441 was negotiated over a period of
eight weeks and passed unanimously on 8 November 2002.
Inter alia, SCR 1441:
• Expressly recalled (and thus re-affirmed) the above-
mentioned resolutions (678 and 687);
• Declared that Iraq was in breach of its disarmament
obligations;
• Gave a deadline of 30 days for a full and complete
declaration of the Iraqi weapons programme;
• Warned of serious consequences if there was further
non- compliance by Iraq in this regard.
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If the SC had intended to reserve to itself the right to
authorise force by means of a further resolution, it could
obviously have done so. Indeed this approach was
discussed informally by members of the Security Council
but never became the subject of a draft resolution or vote;
see Hansard, 25 November 2002 at page 53 (per the
Foreign Secretary).
The SC could also have qualified its reference to
resolutions 678 and 687, and thus made it clear that
member states could not use force to deal with the threat
posed to peace and security by Iraq. It did not do so. The
fact that there is now some disagreement as to what was
meant by SCR 1441 cannot prevent the words of that
resolution (or indeed the earlier resolutions) from carrying
their plain and ordinary meaning.
CONCLUSION
The use of necessary and proportionate force, in
accordance with international humanitarian law by
coalition forces, to neutralise the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein’s failure to comply with UN imposed
disarmament obligations can be rooted in:
• SCR 678 (authority to use force);
• SCR 687 (the requirement for the Iraqi regime to,
inter alia, disarm so as to remove the threat to
international peace and security it posed);
• SCR 1441 (confirmation of SCR’s 678, 687, and of the
fact that Iraq’s continued non-compliance with
disarmament obligations triggered serious
consequences).
Post intervention, emerging issues are likely to include
the following:
• Possible attempts to challenge the intervention at the
International Court of Justice (compare with the
attempt to challenge the NATO action in Kosovo in
March 1999);
• Possible attempts to persuade the DPP to carry out a
“war crimes” investigation in the event that UK forces
bomb civilian targets and/or an argument can be made
to this effect;
• War crimes trials/asset freezing action in respect of
Saddam and/or his accomplices;
• Security Council interaction on humanitarian issues
and post conflict issues in Iraq – potential for other
states to use this as a platform to condemn the
intervention and/or using this to effect “retrospective
legitimacy”.
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Ibase my view on child protection on an analysis ofdomestic legislation and case law in several domesticjurisdictions. It is important to clarify at the outset that
I can only attempt to convince the reader of a general
pattern of distortion and that different legal systems differ
in the degree of compatibility between the reality of child
protection, and its portrayal in child law rhetoric.
My thesis is based around the following six
complementary claims:
1. Child protection law is typically perceived through its
aims and mandates as offering the child comprehensive
protection from all harm.
2. These aims and mandates disguise a preoccupation
State protection of the
child – mirage or
reality?
by Dr Ya’ir Ronen
My central point in this article is that state protection of the child as
projected by the legal rhetoric of child protection law is a mirage in
that it gives the misleading impression of comprehensive protection
to the child from all harm while typically failing to offer such
protection.
